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The Institutional Investor Disclosure Act:
An Analysis of the Consumer Benefits
Financial intermediaries such as bank trust departments, insurance
companies, pension funds, mutual funds, endowment funds, and
foundations manage one-third of the securities investments in the
United States.1 Congress is now considering legislation that would
amend the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 to require frequent dis-
closure of the portfolio holdings and transactions of these institutional
investors.3 Such disclosure would involve a major extension of the
reporting jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and a wide expansion of the pool of centrally located and
publicly available data on securities holdings and transactions.
4
I. SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 70 (1971) [hereinafter cited as IIS REPORT].
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970) [hereinafter cited as Securities Exchange Act].
3. At present three institutional investor disclosure bills are before Congress. S.2234,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1973) [hereinafter cited as S.2234], was submitted on July 23,
1973, by Senator Williams for himself, and Senators Brooke, McIntyre, Proxmire, and
Tower. S.2683, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as S.2683], is the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) proposed modification of S.2234. Letter
from Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the SEC, to Senator Williams, Dec. 13, 1973 (on
file with the Yale Law Journal). H.R. 13986, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. 13986], was submitted on April 4, 1974, by Congressman Moss for him-
self and Congressmen Broyhill (N.C.), Eckhardt, and Luken. The Senate bills have
been referred to the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, and the House bill will probably be referred to the Sub-
committee on Commerce and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce. Senate and House hearings are planned for spring, 1974. Inter-
views with Alton B. Harris, Chief Counsel to the Senate Subcomm. on Securities, and
Harvey A. Rowen, Special Counsel to the House Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance,
in Washington, D.C., Mar. 20, 1974.
4. Jurisdiction over reporting by institutional investment managers is fragmented
among the states and various federal agencies. IIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 24-32. SEC
jurisdiction is confined presently to those investment managers registered under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I to -52 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as the Investment Company Act], and the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1
to -21 (1970). IIS REPORT 25, 30.
In 1969, institutional investment managers in the United States controlled about
$696 billion in assets. Bank trust departments controlled about $255 billion, insurance
firms about $246 billion, and other institutional investment managers outside SEC
reporting jurisdiction about $88 billion. The amount controlled by managers subject
to SEC reporting jurisdiction was about $107 billion. However, the SEC actually re-
quired reporting on only $61 billion, principally the funds managed by registered in-
vestment companies. The proposed legislation would thus expand the segment of the
capital market represented in SEC holdings and transaction reporting from $61
billion to $696 billion. A current survey of institutional investor practices and trends
is available. Hearings on the Impact of Institutional Investors in the Stock Market
Before the Subcomm. on Financial Markets of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Finance Hearings].
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The legislation's proponents have stated two general purposes of
the proposed disclosure: the prevention of fraud and manipulation by
institutional investment managers and the education of consumers5
about the performance of the portfolios being managed in their be-
half." If prevention of fraud and manipulation were the major pur-
pose, the need for legislation would be questionable. For example,
a recent study7 casts doubt on the often heard argument that institu-
tions are responsible for the "two-tier" market," a condition of the
stock market in which a few stocks favored by institutions sell at arti-
ficially high price-earnings ratios, while all other stocks are allowed
by the market to seek their own price-earnings ratios. 9 Moreover, re-
cent statistical analyses conclude that disclosure under the federal
securities statutes is of little or no benefit in preventing fraud and
manipulation.' 0
5. The term "consumer" as used in this Note refers to the purchaser of investment
management or investment advisory services. It includes individual investors using
the investment advice of broker-dealers. In the case of mutual funds, pension trusts,
and other institutional purchasers of management and advisory services, the term is
meant to embrace not only the fund's officers but also its shareholders or beneficiaries.
6. See IIS REPORT, supra note I, at XIII, XXIX; 119 CONG. REC. S23524 (daily ed.
Dec. 20, 1973) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen); Comments-of Alton B. Harris, Chief Counsel
to the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 4th Ann. Nat'l Legis. Conf., Ass'n of Private Pension and Welfare Plans,
Washington, D.C., Feb. 20, 1974; E. Malca, Statement Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Markets of the Senate Comm. on Finance, Feb. 5, 1974, at 10-11 (hearings to be published).
7. U.S. Treas. Dep't, Public Policy for American Capital Markets, BNA 1974 SEc.
REG. L. REP. No. 239, at D-l, D-12-14 (Feb. 13, 1974) (prepared by James H. Lorie).
Much of the general, substantial decline in the prices of common stocks since
1968 can be explained on the basis of normal economic relationships. As the rate
of inflation increased, the expected rate of inflation increased with a consequent
increase in nominal interest rates. And predictably and naturally, as the nominal
cost of debt capital rose, the cost of equity capital rose. In the absence of a
general expectation of rapidly rising profits, the increased cost of equity capital
has been reflected in declining price-earnings ratios. Although some stocks have
much higher price-earnings ratios than others, this has always been true. Institu-
tional investing is not plausible as an explanation of a phenomenon which existed
before institutional investing became so important.
Id. at D-14. Specifically, with respect to charges that institutional investors act in con-
cert to manipulate the markets, the study stated that its analysis indicates that the
incidence of parallel trading by institutions is not more common than such trading by
individuals and that, in fact, institutions do not blindly play "follow the leader" but buy
and sell to and from each other. Id. at D-13.
8. See, e.g., Loomis, How the Terrible Two-Tier Market Came to Wall Street,
FORTUNE, July 1973, at 82, reprinted in Finance Hearings, supra note 4, at 315.
9. Whatever may have been the origins of the two-tier market, the phenomenon
now seems to be fading. See, e.g., Vartan, New Forms of Competition Knock on Wall
Street's Door, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1974, § 3, at 57, col. 3; Wolman, Banks Stir Con-
troversy as a Stock Market Force, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1973, § 3, at 3, col. 5.
10. Professor George J. Benston of the University of Rochester conducted an em-
pirical analysis of stock prices on the New York Stock Exchange before and after enact-
ment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. He used statistical regression techniques to
test the hypothesis that the Act contributed to the prevention of fraud and manipulation.
The conclusion of this study, then, must be that the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had no measurable positive effect on the securities
traded on the NYSE. There appears to have been little basis for the legislation
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Institutional disclosure, however, would help the consumer of in-
vestment management services shop for the portfolio manager who
meets the consumer's specifications of risk" and return at lowest cost.
The Institutional Investor Study, published by the SEC in 1971,12 con-
cluded that techniques of risk and return evaluation made possible by
the availability of holdings and transaction data would be of use in
such an evaluation of portfolio managers. 13 However, the Study did not
elaborate on the specific ways the data and techniques could be of use
or on the process by which the benefits could be disseminated to a
large number of consumers. 14 A major reason for these omissions is
that both the theory and commercial applications of risk and return
analysis were new and not widespread at the time of the Study. This
Note analyzes the benefits of institutional investor disclosure by
examining theoretical and commercial developments since the Study.
It recommends enactment of institutional disclosure legislation which
provides for reporting of the disclosed data by portfolio and which
subjects asset categories in addition to common stock to transaction
disclosure. It also recommends that the disclosed data be available
from the SEC in consolidated, standard format, computer-readable
form in order to facilitate use by investment advisers. Each element of
and no evidence that it was needed or desirable. Certainly there is doubt that
more required disclosure is warranted.
Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Ams. ECON. REv. 132, 153 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Benston].
Henry Manne has summarized and endorsed the Benston study. Manne, Sins of Com-
mission: A New Study Challenges SEC Disclosure Policies, BARRON% Aug. 20, 1973,
at 7, col. 1.
Professor George Stigler reached a similar conclusion about the 1933 Act some
years ago. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 U. CHI. J. Bus. 117,
120-24 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Stigler]. His conclusion is widely accepted by econ-
omists. R. PosNR, ECONOMc ANALYSIS OF LAW 199 (1972) [hereinafter cited as POSNER].
A.A. Sommer, Jr., a SEC Commissioner, delivered a comprehensive rebuttal to these
criticisms in a speech before the Conference Board. Address by A.A. Sommer to the
Conf. Board, "Required Disclosure in the Stock Market": The Other Side, SEC News
Release, Sept. 27, 1973. Sommer does not dispel Benston's conclusions, however, prin-
cipally because Sommer invokes no empirical data refuting Benston's findings and does
not refute Benston's theoretical foundations. Sommer simply asserts that he does not
believe the results. Id. at 5. Moreover, he appears not to have fully evaluated Benston's
article, since he attacks Benston at one point on the basis that "the knowledge
that a report is going to have to be filed which could result in significant liability
will discipline the earlier disclosure and assure its integrity." Id. at 7. However, Benston's
point is that even if there is such an effect on disclosure, it has made no measurable
difference with respect to fraud and manipulation. Benston 152-53.
11. The term "risk" refers to variance in the return on a given investment. It is
the dispersion of less likely outcomes around a most likely outcome. An investment is
deemed riskless if a given level of return is guaranteed: an investment becomes in-
creasingly risky as the chances increase that the return will differ from the expected
value. IIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 400-01.
12. Id. at 1-4. This reference includes a useful list of other studies of institutional
investment managers, dating back to 1906.
13. Id. at XIII.
14. See, e.g., id. at XIII, 360-74.
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cost of these provisions is identified and analyzed. It is argued that the
incremental costs they entail are small and possibly negligible.
I. Capital Market Theory
The Institutional Investor Study's recommendation that risk and
return data be made available to consumers of investment manage-
ment services was based on capital market theory. 15 Capital market
theory seeks to explain the determination of prices of capital assets
in a free market system by examining the expected return of differ-
ent investments in relation to their risk. The central notion is that
the price of an asset is a function of both its expected return and
the variability of that return.'6
Two principal elements of the theory are portfolio theory and the
capital asset pricing model. Portfolio theory examines the question of
investing in different assets by describing each person's investment
decisions in terms of that person's total portfolio. One of the principal
conclusions of portfolio theory is that an individual asset's value
can be properly determined only by examining the asset's effect on
the expected return and risk of the whole portfolio of which it is
a part.
For example, a portfolio equally divided between savings bonds and
high risk securities might well subject an investor to the same risk level
as a portfolio consisting entirely of medium risk securities. Further-
more, since the prices of the several securities in a portfolio may
vary in different directions, or at least at different rates over time,
the riskiness of the whole portfolio is typically less than the average
15. See, e.g., id. at XIII, 400.
16. See J. LORIE & Mv,. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET-THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 210-11
(1973) [hereinafter cited as LORIE & HAMILTON]. Probably the best detailed treatments
of capital market theory are found in E. FAMA & M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE
(1972); M. JENSEN, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKETS (1972).
One recent use of the theory has been an analysis of the performance of bank coin-
mingled pension funds. E. MALCA, BANK-ADMINISTERED COMMINGLED PENSION FUNDS-
PERFORMANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS 1962-1970 (1973). Many financial firms are using the
theory in commercial applications. See, e.g., A.G. Becker & Co., The Management Ap-
proach to Funds Evaluation, undated. For a survey of these applications, see pp. 1281-
82 infra. For presentation and analysis of legal implications of the theory, see V.
BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 1089-1135 (1972); POSNER, supra note
10, at 191-203; R. Posner, Should Trustees and Other Institutional Investors Purchase
Shares in the (name not yet chosen) Fund?, July 14, 1972 (brief for Wells Fargo Fund)
(on file with the Yale Law Journal) (Note 42 infra explains the type of fund);
Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Econontic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604 (1971); Lybccker,
Regulation of Bank Trust Department Activities, 82 YALE L.J. 977 (1973); Note, The
Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARv. L. REV. 603 (1970); Note, Regulating Risk-
Taking by Mutual Funds, 82 YALE L.J. 1305 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Regulating
Risk-Taking].
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riskiness of its securities. The expected return on a whole portfolio,
on the other hand, is merely the weighted average of the expected
returns on the securities composing it. Therefore, diversifying a
portfolio among various securities, instead of investing in only one
kind of security, will reduce the risk an investor must bear to attain
any given expected return on his portfolio.' 7
The capital asset pricing model provides a basis for determining the
value to an investor of different portfolios. It enables an investor to
evaluate past results by examining the risk and compensating return
of his portfolio and to plan his future investments by specifying the
level of risk and expected return he wishes to maintain. In using the
model, the investor first specifies the categories of assets which may
be used to constitute the portfolio. A "market portfolio" for those cate-
gories must then be established. The market portfolio is the core
of the model.
The market portfolio is a portfolio that includes each individual
security from the asset categories, with the quantity of each individual
security proportional to its market value.' 8 For example, in examining
portfolios made up of corporate bonds and common stock, the asset
categories would be corporate bonds and common stock. The market
portfolio would be a portfolio made up of all common stock and
corporate bonds, each issue being held in the same proportion that
the total market value of that issue bears to the total market value
of all common stock and corporate bonds. The capital asset pricing
model provides a basis for planning and evaluation by permitting
comparison of the risk and return of a portfolio with one standard, the
market portfolio. 19 The usefulness of the market portfolio rests on
two factors. First, its riskiness and expected return can be varied by
borrowing or lending. If the investor desires a lower level of risk than
that of the market portfolio, he would place a fraction of his funds
in that portfolio. He would place the rest in a risk-free investment,
such as a savings account. If the investor desires a higher return and
risk level than that of the market portfolio, he would borrow to in-
vest more in the market portfolio, thereby leveraging his position in
the portfolio. The second factor of the market portfolio's usefulness
is that the various combinations of borrowing or lending from the
17. Note, Regulating Risk.Taking 1315-16.
18. LORIE & HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 242-43, 249, 272.
19. Id. at 210, 242.
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market portfolio trace out a baseline of return versus risk that can
be used as a comparison standard for planning and evaluating the
operation of a portfolio.
20
20. A graph can be used for illustration of the capital asset pricing model. Assume
an investor is considering how best to invest his funds among corporate bonds, mort-
gages, and common stock. His task is to consider the alternative compositions of his
portfolio so that for each level of return he might seek, he maintains minimum risk,
or, conversely, for any level of risk he is willing to endure, his expected return is
maximized. The alternative portfolios would consist of varying combinations of cor-
porate bonds, mortgages, and stocks and varying individual selections of securitics
within those categories. Using portfolio theory, the risk and return of the possible
portfolios can be calculated. The result of the calculations is the efficient frontier,
the locus of points representing the maximum return possible for each level of risk.
Return
0 Risk
For the moment, the dashed line, RN, and the points on RN, may be ignored. Higher
return can be obtained only by assuming higher risks. Portfolios A and B lie on the
efficient frontier; no higher return is obtainable at their levels of risk. Thus, port-
folio C is inefficient because portfolio A provides higher expected return at the same
level of risk. Portfolio D is infeasible; there is no combination of bonds, mortgages,
and stocks that can be expected to produce D's return at D's level of risk.
When the possibility of borrowing or lending is introduced, the shape of the effi-
cient frontier changes. R is the return on a risk-free asset and the rate at which funds
may be borrowed. Portfolios along line MR can be obtained by combining the risk-
free asset with portfolio M, and portfolios along MN can be obtained by leveraging
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Empirical testing of the capital asset pricing model has shown that
it is a valuable tool for portfolio planning and evaluation.21 The
model views the consumer's net benefit from a portfolio as the re-
turn (the appreciation or depreciation of the portfolio plus any dis-
tributed earnings) minus the costs incurred in operating the port-
folio. The three components of cost are the cost of excess risk, trans-
action costs, and management fees.
22
For each given level of expected return on a portfolio, there is a
minimum risk that need be endured. This is the risk associated with
the given return on the borrowing-lending baseline of the model.
Risk in excess of the borrowing-lending baseline thus results in a dollar
CoSt.
2 3
Transaction costs are the brokerage commissions, dealer charges,
and other fees paid when securities are sold or acquired. 24 Manage-
ment fees are the charges made by investment managers to their clients
portfolio M. Note that portfolio N is more efficient than portfolio B: At the same level
of risk, portfolio N has a higher expected return. Portfolio Q is more efficient than
portfolio A: At the same level of expected return, portfolio Q has less risk. Thus, as-
suming that unlimited borrowing and lending at the risk-free rate is possible, the effi-
cient frontier becomes line RN. This line is the baseline used in comparing actual
or projected portfolio results. In the literature it is usually referred to as the capital
market line, because the point M, where the dashed line RN is tangent with the
efficient frontier, is the market portfolio. W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL
MARKErs 81-91 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SHARPE]. See also LORIE & HAMILTON, supra
note 16, at 189. Applications of the model require some adjustments because borrowing
and lending rates are not equal. Id. at 252. Also, recent research has used portfolio
theory to show that the market line can be established even when riskless borrowing
or lending is not available. For a discussion of this recent work and of the various
solutions to the practical problems of using the model, see Jensen, Capital Markets:
Theory and Evidence, 3 BELL J. EcoN. MoT. Sm. 357 (1972). Use of the capital market
line as a performance measurement baseline, both in planning and evaluation, is wide-
spread. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Investment Performance Analysis
Comparative Survey 1968-1972, at 9, June 1973 [hereinafter cited as Merrill Lynch
Survey].
21. LORIE & HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 207-10, 226-27.
22. Telephone Interview with John A. McQuown, Vice Pres. Mgt. Sci. of the Wells
Fargo Bank, Jan. 15, 1974. Research on the structure of costs in individual portfolios
is recent and not yet extensive. However, the importance of comparative cost data
on portfolios has been clearly made in the literature. See, e.g., SHARPE, supra note 20,
at 103.
23. In the graph of note 20 supra, assume that portfolio A were actually con-
structed and operated in order to obtain the level of return at portfolio A. Because the
same level of return is available from portfolio Q, portfolio A incurs excess risk
represented by the horizontal distance from Q to A. The cost of this risk is the
foregone return that should accompany the extra risk. This cost is measured by the
vertical distance from point A to the dashed baseline RN.
24. The various methods of charging for brokerage or dealer services in securities
transactions are discussed in SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUsING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, SEN. Doc. No. 13, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 43-51 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY]; and in IfS REPORT,
supra note I, at 1959-61. Commissions are usually calculated and billed separately
from the trade, but in the case of many trades executed off an exchange, the trans-
action fee is part of the actual sale or purchase price, as when a dealer in large
blocks of securities buys or sells from his inventory of securities. Id. at 1960.
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for operation of the portfolio.25 Fees for research are usually billed
as a separate item under management fees.20 However, compensation
to brokerages for research is usually incorporated in the brokerage
commission.
27
Return and cost calculations can assist investors in both planning
and evaluating investments. In planning, the investor can determine
which combinations of assets under consideration yield the highest
return at each level of risk. The investor then uses the risk level he
seeks, or the return he must attain, in order to construct the best
possible portfolio. Since no excess risk will result from the main-
tenance of the best possible portfolio, subtraction of the estimated
management and transaction fees from the expected return yields
the net benefit.
This planning approach is useful to investors for several reasons.
Before the advent of capital market theory, the effects of risk had
not been as precisely measurable as those of return.2 8 Capital market
theory facilitates quantification of the effect of risk (as well as of
return) in designing portfolios. Moreover, the theory permits identifi-
cation of the best allocation of funds among different categories of
assets. For example, the decision to allocate portions of a fund among
bonds and stocks has historically been made on the basis of separate
analysis of each category. The effects on total return and total risk
of different divisions have been analyzed only in a rough, elementary
way.29 Furthermore, specification of risk and return gives the con-
sumer of investment management services a detailed basis on which
to make comparisons of the services of different investment man-
agers or brokers by making it possible to set a bench mark of ex-
pected return and costs against which the portfolio and its manager
may be evaluated after each quarter's results are in.
Analysis of risk and return permits detailed diagnosis of the factors
affecting portfolio performance. The consumer can determine to
what extent actual results are due to his own specifications of return
and risk and to what extent they are due to the costs incurred by the
investment manager. It makes it easier for consumers to determine
25. Management fee arrangements are discussed extensively in US REPORT, supra note
1, at 225-66 (investment advisory complexes), at 476-83 (bank trust departments), and
at 670-84 (life insurance companies).
26. SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 24, at 60-62.
27. Id.
28. Quantified and separate analysis of risk and return is generally traced to the
work of Harry M. Markowitz in the early 1950's. See LORIE & HAMILTON, supra note
16, at 172; H. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION xiii, 7 (1959).
29. LORIE & HAMILTON 245-46.
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when and why they should change investment managers, or, if the
consumer makes his own investment decisions, the source of advice.
A striking example of the use of capital market theory for planning
and evaluation is its applicability in constructing performance, or
incentive, fees. 3° Whether or not a performance fee is involved, speci-
fication of risk and return by the consumer and the investment man-
ager provides a detailed basis for judging the objectives and results
of the investment process and permits consumers to identify those
investment managers who produce the highest net benefit from port-
folio operations.31
Analysis of risk and return enhances the possibility of increasing
the net benefit of each person entitled to a share of the portfolio. Thus
pension fund participants, fund trustors, and individuals who con-
struct their own portfolios can benefit when their portfolio is sub-
jected to such analysis.
II. Application of Capital Market Theory
Practical application of capital market theory requires a large
amount of securities market data. Although the theory currently en-
joys wide commercial use, lack of data has stymied further develop-
ment of commercial applications.
A. Data Requirements
An important step in applying capital market theory is establishing
the indexes necessary to estimate the return and risk of the market
portfolio for the asset categories being considered. The popularly
known common stock indexes, such as Standard & Poor's "500" Stock
Index, are examples of indexes used as proxies for the market port-
folio of common stocks.32 To calculate the index for a particular type
of asset, a statistically dependable sample33 of the market values of
the securities in that asset category must be obtained and maintained
over time.34 Measurement of return also requires knowledge of the
30. F. Modigliani 9- G. Pogue, A Study of Market Line Investment Performance
Fees, April 1973, at 1 (working paper, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management) (also
on file with the Yale Law Journal) (quoted by permission of the authors) [hereinafter
cited as Modigliani & Pogue].
31. LORIE &- HAMILTON 249-58.
32. Id. at 249. Standard 9: Poor's "500" is a value-weighted index of prices of 425
industrials, 25 railroads, and 50 utilities, all of which are listed on the New York
Stock Exchange. Id. at 62, 249.
33. A statistically dependable sample is one large enough to provide an accurate es-
timate of the characteristics of the whole population.
34. LoRm & HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 51-54.
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magnitude of distributions, such as dividends or interest.35 At present
only common stock indexes and some limited bond and commodity
indexes are available.36 Indexes for other forms of security participa-
tions and for combinations of securities (for example, an index for
portfolios containing stocks, municipal bonds, and corporate bonds)
have not been developed 37 because market value and return informa-
tion on a statistically dependable cross section of most securities are not
available. 38 For example, even though a great many bond trades are
reported, the available indexes are limited and statistically unreliable
because many major trades take place directly between the parties
involved and are never reported.3 9 In fact, even the available common
stock indexes have been criticized as being only rough approximations
of the total market they represent.
40
In addition to market value and return information for calculating
indexes, the application of capital market theory requires return and
cost information on a statistically dependable sample of other port-
folios. This information is essential in determining a fair estimate of
the costs to subtract from the baseline portfolio when evaluating an
actual portfolio. Since the baseline portfolio of the capital asset pric-
ing model incurs no actual costs of excess risk, transaction costs, or
management fees, an estimate of such costs must be deducted from the
baseline portfolio's return in order that a fair comparison with an
actual portfolio be made.41 The actual costs of a sample of other port-
folios is the logical source for such an estimate.
Return and cost data on other portfolios also make it easier for
consumers to determine if they could get better investment manage-
ment services elsewhere. Further, to the extent the market involved is
efficient, so that expected return is the same for any selected level of
35. Id. at 63-64.
36. Typical bond indexes are those available from Moody's, Fitch, Standard Sta.
tistics, and Poor's. See, e.g., id. at 211-12. Typical commodity indexes include the
Dow Jones Futures, Dow Jones Spot, and Reuter United Kingdom. See, e.g., Com.
modities, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1974, at 22, col. 2.
37. Interview with Theodore S. Rosky, Vice Pres. Individual Ins. Ops. and James
A. Tate, Second Vice Pres. Sec. Dep't, Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., in Hartford, Conn.,
Mar. 3, 1973; Telephone Interview with John A. McQuown, supra note 22; Telephone
Interview with Prof. William F. Sharpe, Bus. Prof. at Stanford Univ., Mar. 2, 1974.
38. See Interviews cited supra note 37.
39. See Interviews cited supra note 37.
40. LoRIn & HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 249-50.
41. Modigliani and Pogue state the problem of establishing a fair estimate of expenseb:
The performance comparison between a fund and its comparison index will be
meaningful only if the index represents a viable investment alternative to the
fund. The standard should not represent a theoretical and unobtainable target but
an alternative in which the fund assets could have been invested.
Modigliani & Pogue, supra note 30, at 39.
Unfortunately, however, "[a]t the present time there is no precedent for reducing
the return on the comparison standard to reflect a reasonable level of fund operating
expenses." Id. at 30.
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risk, cost minimization becomes critical to maximizing the net benefit
from investments.
4 2
Calculation of the return and cost for other portfolios in a given
period requires several items of information. First, each holding and
its market value must be known as of the beginning and end of the
period. Second, distributions such as dividends or interest for each
holding must be known. Third, the sum of the management fees must
be known. Finally, the sum of the transaction costs is needed.
43
In summary, full use of the capital asset pricing model requires a
wide sample of data. In order to apply the model to all categories of
assets, data on the market value and distributions (such as dividends
or interest) of a dependable sample from each category is needed. In
order to permit fair use of the baseline and to permit consumers to
compare costs, the period's starting and ending holdings and market
values, distributions, management fees, and transaction costs are
needed for a dependable sample of portfolios.
B. Current Commercial Applications
The limited public availability of holdings and transaction data
has restricted the feasibility of commercial application of capital mar-
ket theory to firms that have private access to the operating data on
a large number of portfolios. Typically, these firms obtain this data
from their brokerage or planning and evaluation clientele. Their
applications of capital market theory, which have been confined by
available data to stock analysis, 44 include in-house evaluations, 45
mutual fund evaluation, 46 construction of portfolios, 4T and services
42. See LORIE & HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 106-08. Wells Fargo Bank and American
National Bank & Trust Company in fact manage certain funds on the principle that
the stock market is sufficiently efficient to warrant a strategy of simply buying and
holding a portfolio at the desired level of risk or return. Trading in search of gains
on underpriced or overpriced securities is considered futile and is eliminated. Laing,
Bye-Bye Go-Go, Wall St. J., June 7, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
43. IIS REPORT, supra note 1, at 409-10: SHARPE, supra note 20, at 94. Periodic hold-
ings data is necessary in order to calculate the costs due to excess risk, since the
riskiness of the total portfolio is calculated by determining the riskiness of each
security in the portfolio. A succinct exposition of the elements that constitute trans-
action costs is available in F. Black & M. Scholes, From Theory to a New Financial
Product, Jan. 1974 (working paper of the Graduate School of Bus., Univ. of Chicago)
(also on file with the Yale Law Journal).
44. Compare Merrill Lynch Survey, supra note 20, at 3-18, with id. at 19-27.
45. American National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago uses the capital asset
pricing model in evaluating the management of certain of its internal funds. Telephone
Interview with Rex A. Sinquefield, Trust Investment Officer of the Am. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., Apr. 10, 1974.
46. As one of its services, Wiesenberger Services offers evaluations of mutual funds
that include designation of risk level. See, e.g., Wiesenberger Services, Mutual Fund
Performance Monthly, Jan. 1974, at 3.
47. Wells Fargo Bank of San Francisco and American National Bank & Trust Com-
pany of Chicago are pioneers in this field. See T. Prasil & R. Sinquefield, American
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that evaluate pension and endowment fund management. 4 The client
of the evaluation services is usually a fiduciary who wishes to evaluate
his fund's investment manager.4 The services provide both evaluation
and assistance in planning future risk and return objectives. The effect
is to sharpen competition among investment managers by providing
consumers with detailed comparative data that has been unavailable
in the past."o
C. Obstacles to Wider Applications
For several reasons, development of the applications of capital mar-
ket theory is stymied by the inaccessibility of portfolio holdings and
transaction data.
1. Limited entry into the investment manager evaluation market.
To obtain the holdings and transaction data necessary for cost com-
parisons with other portfolios, an evaluating service must accumulate
the data from its own clients because the data is not publicly avail-
able. Therefore, a firm must have a large clientele in order to have
a large and statistically reliable data base. The effect is to limit the
number of firms that can provide such services, since economic via-
bility for such firms depends on a large number of clients at the out-
set. If a publicly available base of raw data were available in easily
processed form, a small computer analysis company could begin busi-
ness with only a few clients.
National Bank Equity Collective Investment Operating Policy, Aug. 2, 1973 (unpublished
paper prepared for Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago) (on file with the Yale
Law Journal); S. Quay & W. Wagner, New Concepts in Portfolio Management, June
22, 1972 (unpublished paper prepared for Wells Fargo Bank) (on file with the Yale Law
journal).
48. A summary of the types of service provided is found in O'Brien, How Market
Theory Can Help Investors Set Goals, Select Investment Managers, and Appraise In-
vestment Performance, FIN. ANAL. J., July-Aug. 1970, at 91, 103. See A.G. Becker & Co.,
supra note 16; A.G. Becker & Co., Funds Evaluation Service: Measurement Techniques,
1973. See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Merrill Lynch Presents IPA-
Investment Performance Analysis, undated; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Security Risk Evaluation Service: Technical Addendum, Mar. 1972.
49. Recent commentators have argued that capital market theory should be incor-
porated into the prudent man rule which governs the acts of fiduciaries. To the extent
fiduciaries are unrestricted in their choice of securities, their individual security
selections would be evaluated for prudence on the basis of the total return of the
portfolio. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 10, at 196-97; Treynor, What the Courts Ought
to Know about Prudence, FIN. ANAL. J., Mar.-Apr. 1973, at 11.
More importantly, however, prudence may also require use of the theory in estab-
lishing as precise a statement of investment policy as the given restrictions, if any,
allow, with follow up evaluation of conformance to such policy. Without such spe-
cification, investment planning is crude and inexact. See LORIE & HAMILTON, supra
note 16, at 255; A.G. Becker & Co., supra note 16, at 3; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Merrill Lynch Presents IPA-Investment Performance Analysis, undated, at 3.
50. See William A. Dreher & Associates, Investment Supervision-Opportunity and
Obligation for Plan Sponsors, at 24-26, 1973.
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2. Exclusion of small investors. The minimum fee that evaluation
services presently charge is so high that a consumer needs a sizable
portfolio for the costs of evaluation to be proportional to its bene-
fits.0 ' A public data base would lower the overhead cost of investment
analysis services, thereby reducing the break-even point on the fees
the services must charge. It would be profitable to extend capital
market theory applications to the portfolios of individuals with annual
incomes well under $100,000, possibly as low as 15,000.r2
3. Limitation of analysis to stocks. Since the current availability
of statistically dependable indexes is limited to stocks, with the excep-
tion of some narrow categories of bonds and commodities, extension
of capital asset pricing model applications to nonstock assets is stymied.
The importance of extension of the use of the model to nonstock
assets has been forcefully argued by the researchers in capital market
theory. 3 Moreover, in 1968 the value of nonstock securities in the
United States was more than twice as large as the value of stocks,
0 4
and institutional investors managed over a third of the nonstock se-
curitiesA0 Thus, on the basis of 1968 data, holdings and transaction
data on securities held by institutional investors would represent a
statistically dependable sampling of the nonstock securities of the
United States capital markets. Such reporting would also improve the
stock indexes now available.00
D. Evidence that Extended Holdings and Transaction Data
Would be Used by the Private Sector
The proliferation of commercial applications of the theory is evi-
dence that a public data base would be used by private industry to
serve both institutional and individual investors.0 7 In addition, the
trends toward competitive brokerage rates and centralization of
51. The minimum portfolio size that can bear the cost of these evaluation services
currently appears to be about $1,000,000. Telephone Interview with Anthony P. Lewis,
Vice Pres. of A.G. Becker & Co., Chicago, Feb. 4, 1974.
52. Interview with Rosky and Tate, supra note 37.
53. See, e.g., LORIE & HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 245-46.
54. Short-term claims, bonds, mortgages, and other long-term claims comprised 33.4
percent of all assets within the United States; corporate shares comprised 14.9 percent.
1IS REPORT, supra note 1, at 69.
55. Institutions managed 32.3 percent of the short-term claims and 52.3 percent of
the long-term claims. Id. at 70.
56. See p. 1280 supra.
57. For additional evidence of strong entrepreneurial interest in providing detailed,
timely analyses of such public data, see Hillinger, The $1000 Magazine: Stock Market
Analysis, Wash. Post, Nov. 11, 1973, § M, at 1, col. 5.
There is also evidence of SEC policy to encourage individualized portfolio analysis
services. Address by William Casey, SEC Chairman, Economic Club of Detroit, Sept.
18, 1972, at 10-11. Lorie and Hamilton provide a theoretical and empirical foundation
for a more vigorous public policy of improved investment counseling, especially to in-
dividuals. LoRtE & HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 261-62.
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the securities markets5s are likely to stimulate consumer demand for
such services. In a system with competitive brokerage rates, much
research activity would have to be unbundled59 from brokerage work,
creating an opportunity and a need to evaluate the research's impact
on portfolio returns. There would be a similar need to evaluate the
effectiveness of traders in executing trades, which could be done by
comparing transaction costs among portfolios.
In a centralized market system, increased speed of reporting of
price movements and added depth and breadth would enhance effi-
ciency, making it more difficult to trade profitably on publicly avail-
able information. The more efficient the market, the less likely it is
that costs incurred in seeking undervalued or overvalued securities
will be adequately compensated by increased return.0° Consumers
would need the benefit of detailed calculations of return, transac-
tion costs, management fees, and cost of excess risk in order to ensure
that they do not bear excessive costs.
Two additional developments facilitate realization of the consumer
benefits of capital market theory and enhance the likelihood that
holdings and transaction data would be used by the private sector.
A principal development is the increasing use and understanding of
computers by investment management services and their consumers."1
The use of capital market theory is heavily dependent on computer
processing because of the volume of data involved in analyzing the
alternative assets and portfolios. Another development is the prolifera-
tion of Monte Carlo simulation techniques. These techniques use
computers to estimate the future income consequences of selecting
alternative levels of risk and return, and so are helpful in matching a
portfolio to the consumer's needs for future income.
2
58. Both of these trends appear inexorable. See Bacon, Rocking the Boat-Chairman
Ray Garrett of SEC Seeks Change in Reluctant Industry, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1974,
at 1, col. I. Changes to date include a creation of a consolidated stock-ticker tape for
use in all exchanges, to be operative by 1975, and gradual elimination of high minimum
fees for brokerage. Id. at 21, col. 6. In addition, the SEC is gradually eliminating fixed
commission rates by requiring negotiated rates on trades above a certain size. The
cutoff amount is currently S300,000. By April 30, 1975, all fixed commission will be
eliminated. See Address by Ray Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the SEC, to the Investment
Ass'n, SEC News Release, Oct. 3, 1973, at 4-8.
59. Competitive rates would tend to force brokers to separate their research and
trading services so that the consumer can better tailor the package of services that he
purchases, SECURITIES INDUS-MY STUDY, supra note 24, at 60-62.
60. LORIE 8 HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 108-09.
61. This extends to the availability of portfolio analysis programs available for
customer use on remote computer consoles. Telephone Interview with W. Moss Luy,
Vice Pres. Wiesenberger Services, New York, Feb. 12, 1974.
62. LORIE & HAMNILTON, supra note 16, at 260-63. O'Brien Associates of Los Angeles,
California, provides such projections over a simulated investment life of several years.
Address by John W. O'Brien, Pres. of O'Brien Associates, Seminar on the Analysis of
Security Prices, Center for Research in Security Prices of the Univ. of Chicago, Nov.
8, 1973.
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III. Adequacy of the Present Disclosure Proposals
At present three institutional disclosure bills are before Congress,
one written in the Senate, one submitted in the Senate at the request
of the SEC, and one written in the House. 63 All three proposals pro-
vide for reporting of the security valuations, distributions, transaction
costs, and management fees necessary to make full use of the capital
asset pricing model and to make cost comparisons among portfolio
managers. 4
The SEC and House versions, however, have several weaknesses
that vitiate their potential consumer benefits. Only one of these weak-
nesses appears in the Senate version. The SEC and House set a juris-
dictional test that is geared to equity holdings only. Institutional in-
vestment managers are required to report only if their total equity
holdings exceed a certain threshold.65 Thus, institutions controlling
massive amounts of debt securities but only a small amount of equity
would be exempt. This jurisdictional definition overlooks the vital
importance of data on all asset categories. In addition, all three
versions require reporting of transaction data for equity transactions
only.,0 The legislation should adopt the Senate approach that the
63. See note 3 supra.
64. See p. 1281 supra. Section (f)(3) of the SEC version, S.2683, § (f(4) of the Senate
version, S.2234, and § (f)(3) of the House version, H.R. 13986, require reporting of
market value. See S.2683, supra note 3, § (0(3); S.2234, supra note 3, § (0(4); H.R.
13986, supra note 3, § (f)(3). Legislative and regulatory personnel interviewed by the
author state that management fees and distributions to securities in the portfolio would
fall under the "substantially related information" provision of the SEC version, § (f)(3)(B)
(viii), under the Senate provision for "such other information concerning the transaction
or transactions as the Commission, by rule or regulation, may prescribe," § (f)(4)(B)(vii),
and under the House provision for "such other information as the Commission deter-
mines necessary or appropriate for purposes of this subsection," § (f)(3)(C). These per-
sonnel also state that brokerage fees, including separate commissions, are generally
understood to be included under the requirements for price information on trades.
65. See S.2683, § (f)(1); S.2234, § (f)(l); H.R. 13986, § (f)(1). S.2683 and H.R. 13986
set a range of $10 million to $100 million of equity securities. Within this range
they permit the SEC to determine the minimum reportable amount of equity se-
curities in accounts over which an investment manager has investment discretion or
authority. S.2234 specifies a cutoff of "at least" 910 million of securities, including
equity and nonequity, as to investment managers and $5 million as to exchange mem-
bers or broker-dealers. The term "at least" in S.2234 appears to mean that all port-
folios larger than $10 million must be reported. Conceivably, however, '"at least" may
signal an intent to set a lower bound and to permit the SEC to declare the reportable
size. S.2683 and H.R. 13986 would not treat broker-dealers and exchange members
differently from other investment managers. Moreover, S.2683 provides a definition of"equity securities," which narrows the definition of "equity security" already provided
in § 3(a)(ll) of the Securities Exchange Act, to exclude equity securities of "controlled"
subsidiary companies from application of the proposed legislation as to the con-
trolling investment manager.
66. See S.2683, § (0(3); S.2234, § (f)(4); H.R. 13986, § (f)(3). S.2683 and H.R. 13986
set $500,000 as the minimum size of transaction to be reported but authorize the SEC
to alter the cutoff as it determines necessary; S2234 specifies disclosure of all trans-
actions of (a) 2,000 shares or more, or (b) 1 percent of the outstanding shares, which-
ever is less.
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cutoff level of controlled funds be measured by all holdings and not
just equity, and should be modified to require that transactions in all
asset categories be reported, not just equity transactions. The present
provisions would prevent use of the data to create nonstock indexes.
In addition, the SEC version permits aggregation of data by type
of account, while the Senate and House versions are silent on the
question.6 This aggregation renders impossible the task of calculat-
ing comparative cost data for individual portfolios. In order to iden-
tify and evaluate the various cost components of portfolio manage-
ment, the holdings and transaction data must be reported by indi-
vidual portfolio. 6 Institutional disclosure legislation should there-
fore require holdings and transaction data by portfolio.
In order to ensure that the data are being centralized in a highly
accessible form, useful to private industry, all three versions should be
modified to require the SEC to report back to Congress within a cer-
tain period on the use and dissemination of the data. The report
should include information as to the number of private firms sub-
scribing to the data, and the available evidence on use of the data
to assist individual consumers.
In general, the publicity provisions of the present proposals ensure
adequate dissemination of the data.69 However, there should be a
modification of the publicity provision to provide that each reporting
period's data be made available within 15 days of the end of each
quarter, on a set of standard format computer tapes or discs, so that
private industry can incorporate the data promptly and easily into
their services, at minimum cost.70
67. See S.2683, § (f)(3); S.2234, § (f)(4); H.R. 13986, § (f)(3).
68. For example, consider a bank trust department that manages portfolios for
1,000 different individuals, foundations, and pension plans. If the holdings and trans-
action data on all 1,000 portfolios were simply lumped together, the public would
be unable to distinguish the risk and return characteristics of each portfolio. This frus-
trates the consumer benefit of comparison among a large number of separate portfolios.
69. See S.2683, § (f)(5); S.2234, § (f)(6); H.R. 13986, § (f)(4). S.2683 provides that
all information filed with the SEC will be publicly available in such form as the SEC
may prescribe subject to a request for confidentiality by an investment manager in
accordance with § 24 of the Securities Exchange Act. Further, any information which
would identify the equity security holdings of any natural person, or his trust or
estate, would be kept confidential. S.2234 provides that all information filed with thc
SEC will be publicly available, but establishes a special procedure for granting con-
fidentiality which prescribes a more restrictive test than does S.2683 and requires the
SEC to publish its reasons for granting confidentiality. H.R. 13986 grants the SEC
permission to authorize confidentiality in accordance with § 24 of the Securities Ex-
change Act.
70. One of the recommendations of the Institutional Investor Study is that such
information be made more "accessible in usable form" to persons outside the Com-
mission. IIS REPORT, supra note 1, at XI1.
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IV. Cost, Implementation, and Possible Adverse Effects
Institutional disclosure as recommended above could conceivably
have several adverse effects. One is the possibility that a publicly
available data base would lead to a proliferation of small firms offer-
ing erroneous, illiterate, or fraudulent interpretations of the data to
consumers. Also, the disclosure of holdings and transactions by trustee
institutions could frustrate the fulfillment of their fiduciary obliga-
tions by revealing their investment strategies to other investors. Since
the costs of reporting would be passed on to the investment manager's
customers, the proposed legislation might also impose excessive costs
on beneficiaries. These effects could occur in nontrust situations as
well. In general, investment managers could be subsidizing their own
competitors and passing unnecessary costs on to their consumers.
With respect to illiterate use, reports made on a nonindividual
basis-similar to mutual fund reporting services-would probably be
adequately policed by the competitive pressures of the marketplace.
Individualized planning and evaluation services would also be sub-
ject to registration under the Investment Advisers Act.71 With respect
to the effect of the Investment Company Act, the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 193372 on individualized plan-
ning and evaluation services, the SEC has recognized the problem of
determining whether an advisory service that makes large-scale solici-
tations of relatively small accounts is actually offering individualized
service. 73 If the service provides substantially the same advice to each
client, it can become functionally indistinguishable from an invest-
ment company.
74
In a comprehensive study of such services, the SEC has published
a set of guidelines designed both to stimulate such services and to
protect consumers from possible abuses.7  The report concludes that
there is adequate provision for regulation of such firms.70
With respect to cost and competition, investment managers and
71. The Investment Advisers Act defines the term "adviser" to include any person
"who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses
or reports concerning securities." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(ll) (1970). A person providing
portfolio planning and evaluation services falls within this broad definition and must
register under the Act, even when any broker-dealer activities of the firm are organized
and billed separately from the portfolio analysis service. See, e.g., Letter from SEC Div.
of Investment Management Reg. to S. Ghare, Aug. 16, 1973 (publicly available Sept.
16, 1973); Letter from SEC Div. of Investment Management Reg. to Professional Ass'n
Consulting Serv., Inc., June 1, 1973 (publicly available July 1, 1973).
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
73. See SEC Securities Act Rel. No. 33-5321, Oct. 12, 1972.
74. Id.
75. SEC, Small Account Investment Management Services, Jan. 1973.
76. Id. at three (cover letter).
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fiduciaries have raised no legal or policy objections to reporting, pro-
vided the reporting requirements are uniform for all firms and
trustees, reporting costs are reasonable, and the anonymity of indi-
vidual beneficiaries or shareholders is preserved. 7 Moreover, if the
disclosure is effective in improving consumers' ability to plan and
control their investments and to facilitate the implementation of
consumer-oriented reforms in the securities industry, as developed
in the preceding sections, then the legislation would enhance, rather
than frustrate, the fulfillment of fiduciary obligations.78
The issue of adverse effects thus devolves into one of costs. There
are three elements of cost involved.
1. Creating and maintaining the holdings and transaction data. In
the case of virtually all institutional investment managers, the neces-
sary holdings and transaction data are already calculated in the course
of computer processing.7 9 The relevant measure of cost for the pro-
posed legislation thus is the incremental cost to the firms of re-
trieving such data on a separate computer tape or disc, reformatting
it, and sending it to the SEC. One-time and on-going costs are the two
components of the incremental cost. The one-time costs would in-
clude preparing a list of asset categories and securities within those
categories. The list would be necessary so that the headings used in
the data from the various reporting firms would be uniform. The
cost of creating the list would most logically be borne by the SEC,
which, as designer of the list, would be in the best position to control
and minimize the cost. There is also the one-time cost of writing the
77. Telephone Interview with Prof. Edward Malca, Econ. Prof. at City Univ. N.Y.,
Feb. 12, 1974. Virtually all representatives of the institutional investor industry favor
holdings and transaction reporting in principle. See, e.g., Finance Hearings, supra note
4, at 7 (testimony of Donald Regan, Chmn. of the Bd. of Merrill Lynch & Co.), at
72 (testimony of Samuel F. Callaway, Exec. Vice Pres. of Morgan Guaranty Trust Co.),
and at 232 (testimony of Harold Bigler, Vice Pres. of Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., in
behalf of Am. Life Ins. Ass'n).
78. This type of argument acquires some weight from the cases. In the Matter of
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), the SEC held in a lOb-5 proceeding that
while the defendant
undoubtedly occupied a fiduciary relationship to his customers, this relationship
could not justify any actions by him contrary to law. Even if we assume the
existence of conflicting fiduciary obligations, there can be no doubt which is
primary here. On these facts, clients may not expect of a broker the benefits of
his inside information at the expense of the public generally.
40 S.E.C. at 916. This is not to argue that holdings and transaction data are equivalent
to inside information, but simply to show that if the duties imposed by the proposed
legislation did conflict with fiduciary obligations, there is precedent in the securities
law for ruling in favor of the legislated duties.
79. See, e.g., Lybecker, supra note 16, at 1001. Most insurers use computers to
process their accounting data, but most state regulators concentrate on physical data,
performing very little electronic data processing analysis. Blundell & Meyer, Toothless
Tigers? The States' Regulation of Insurance Companies Often Viewed as a Farce, Wall
St. J., Aug. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
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computer programs that retrieve the reportable data in the reporting
firms. Since individual firms manage their own data processing, the
program for retrieving the reportable data from each firm's data
stream would be best written by the individual firm, using the cate-
gories and headings from the SEC's retrieval list. The on-going cost
of reporting would be the extra cost of running the programs. It is
recommended that these costs be borne by the individual firm, to
be passed on to consumers, thereby utilizing cost competition among
investment managers to minimize the cost to the consumer.
With respect to the costs to individual firms, the present proposals
provide the SEC with authority to keep the cost of reporting, even
as recommended above, within bounds that can be borne by reporting
firms and their consumers. In all three versions of the proposed legisla-
tion, the SEC is empowered to make rules that avoid duplicative re-
portings° and to exempt firms from reporting.8' In addition, the SEC
and House versions provide that the SEC can adjust the cutoff level
on size of reportable holdings, 2 so that smaller firms unable to make
the reports are exempted. Thus, the recommendations suggested
above can be incorporated without an excessive cost burden on re-
porting firms or their consumers. The SEC can adjust the population
of reporting firms to include only firms for whom the incremental
cost of reporting is low or negligible. An important consideration in
these adjustments is sample size. In order to collect statistically de-
pendable index and cost comparison data, only a small sample of the
total amount of each type of outstanding security need be taken. 3 It
is possible that only a very few large firms need report in order to
provide enough data. Thus, testimony on the reporting costs of the
proposed legislation should relate not just to incremental data, but
to the incremental costs for only those firms necessary to provide a
statistically valid sampling of all securities.
The last one-time cost is preparation of a computer program for use
by the SEC in collating the data from reporting firms. The program
would simply consolidate data by reading directly from the tapes and
80. See S.2683, § (0(6); S.2234, § (f)(7); H.R. 13986, § (0(3). All three bills provide
the SEC with rulemaking power to avoid unnecessarily duplicative reporting by two
or more investment managers of the same accounts or under other securities laws.
81. See S.2683, § (f)(4); S.2234, § (0(5); H.R. 13986, § (0(3). S.2683 and S.2234 would
give the SEC power by rule, regulation, or order to exempt any investment manager,
any security, any class of investment managers, and any class of securities from the
subsection's reporting requirements. H.R. 13986 authorizes the SEC to grant such
exemptions as are "consistent" with the purposes of the bill.
82. See note 65 supra.
83. The popularly known stock market indexes are actually samples drawn from
the population of all stocks. See LORIE & HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 52-54.
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discs supplied by reporting investment managers. The SEC should
bear the cost of incorporating this data into its data processing sys-
tem and of operating the program, since the SEC, as sole user of the
program, would be in the best position to control and minimize these
costs.
Though there is presently no data on these computer programming
and operations costs, the incremental costs involved would be minor
when considered in light of the benefits of institutional disclosure,
and testimony in hearings on the legislation should detail each cost
element on an incremental basis.
8 4
2. Disseminating and analyzing the data. Once the SEC has con-
solidated the data for a reporting period, copies of the tapes, discs, or
written summaries should be made available to any person at the
SEC's marginal cost. Private service firms and institutional invest-
ment managers would thus have access to a data base that could be
integrated into their investment analysis services. These firms, and
ultimately their consumers, would bear the incremental cost of ana-
lyzing the data.
3. Interpreting the data to consumers. Interpretation of data to
consumers is a service that would be provided directly to the con-
sumer by institutional investment managers, brokerages, and separate
portfolio planning and evaluation services, and the consumer would
bear the cost. Competitive pressures would tend to minimize this cost,
and the substantive content of advice would be subject to SEC regu-
lation.85
Conclusion
The law related to investments is centrally concerned with the de-
tails of the process by which information concerning investments is
created, disseminated, and used. This Note has examined the pro-
posals for institutional investor disclosure in terms of the process by
which the disclosure could be of use to consumers. The Note con-
cludes that three inexpensive provisions are indispensable to the use-
fulness to the consumer of the proposed legislation: extension to
assets other than equity securities, reporting by portfolio, and con-
solidation of the data in a form readily usable by the private sector.
84. Cost reductions in portfolio management that increased the investing consumer's
percentage net return by only one-tenth of one percent would still result in an ag-
gregate benefit to consumers of $700 million, before taxes. This estimate is based on
the approximately $700 billion of capital managed in the United States. See note 4 supra.
85. See p. 1287 supra.
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